This paper describes the development of a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology against a combination hazard of strong wind and rainfall. In this combination hazard PRA, a hazard curve is evaluated in terms of maximum instantaneous wind speed, hourly rainfall, and rainfall duration. A scenario analysis has provided event sequences resulting from the combination hazard of strong wind and rainfall. The typical event sequence was characterized by the function loss of auxiliary cooling system, of which heat transfer tubes could crack due to cycle fatigue caused by cyclic contacts with rain droplets. This cycle fatigue crack could occur if rain droplets enter into the air cooler of the system following the cooler's roof failure due to strong-windgenerated missile impact. This event sequence has been incorporated into an event tree which addresses component failure caused by the combination hazard. As a result, a core damage frequency has been estimated to be about 10 -6 /year in total by multiplying discrete hazard frequencies by conditional decay heat removal failure probabilities. The dominant sequence is the manual operation failure of an air cooler damper following the failure of external fuel tank due to the missile impact. The dominant hazard is the maximum instantaneous wind speed of 20−40 m/s, the hourly rainfall of 20−40 mm/h, and the rainfall duration of 0−10 h.
Introduction
A probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology against earthquakes has been developed as a priority in many countries because of the significant consequences of earthquakes. The Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) published a seismic PRA standard in 2015 (AESJ, 2015) and a tsunami PRA standard in 2012 (AESJ, 2012) . Electric utilities have been conducting seismic and tsunami PRAs using these standards. After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, external hazards aside from earthquakes and tsunamis are also increasingly recognized as important issues for nuclear power plant safety. In particular, quantitative risk assessments are required against various external hazards. In the U.S., American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and American Nuclear Society (ANS) have published a national standard describing technical requirements for several external hazards, such as high wind and external flooding (ASME and ANS, 2013) . U.S. engineers have been making much effort for individual plant examination of external events (NRC, 1991) . International organizations have also considered how to treat external hazards in PRA for nuclear power plants (IAEA, 1995) and key issues based on recent activities (OECD/NEA, 2014) .
In Europe, an alternative methodology different from the PRA was developed for complementary safety assessments, so called "stress tests" (ENSREG, 2012) . This methodology can estimate a margin to core damage against earthquakes and floods. The stress test methodology would be useful and effective to suggest safety measures and accident management strategies that extend margins to core damage against external hazards because a large uncertainty is involved in quantifying external hazard intensity.
Hazard evaluation 2.1 Historical records
In Japan, weather data are recorded at representative local offices of the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA). Near the prototype SFR site for which this study is intended, a local weather observatory measures and collects various weather data including wind speed at the Japan-Sea side in the central Japan region. The JMA has been developing wind database since 1967, which includes the maximum wind speed (the maximum value of 10-minute averaged wind speed) and the maximum instantaneous wind speed (the maximum value of 3-second averaged wind speed). One of Japan-specific external hazards is typhoon, which is a combination hazard of strong wind and rainfall. Although the JMA precipitation data used in the present study include both rainfall and snowfall data, the terminology 'rainfall' used in this paper means one of the combination hazards; therefore, it can be regarded as typhoon.
To investigate the relation between wind and rainfall, we focused on the rainfall data at when annual maximum values (AMVs) of the maximum wind speed were recorded, and categorized those data based on weather data remarks Yamano, Nishino and Kurisaka, Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol.5, No.4 (2018) [DOI: 10.1299/mej. in terms of relation with typhoon (i.e., typhoon likely, possibly and unlikely). Figure 1 compares the categorized data between typhoon likely, possibly and unlikely. There is no clear difference between typhoon possibilities in relation between daily rainfall and wind speed. Considering that there is no clear relation, this study for the combination hazard used wind speed data on the recorded day of the AMVs of hourly rainfall. Historical records are plotted in terms of AMVs of hourly rainfall data from 1937 to 2013 in Fig. 2 , in which the maximum is 60 mm/h. Annual maximum values of max. instantaneous wind speed Yamano, Nishino and Kurisaka, Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol.5, No.4 (2018) [DOI: 10.1299/mej. 2013 and the maximum instantaneous wind speed from 1967 to 2013, in which the maximums are 23 m/s and 36 m/s, respectively. Figure 4 shows the AMVs of the rainfall duration of the day when the AMVs of hourly rainfall was recorded and on around two days. The maximum rainfall duration is 80 h in this record. The duration data reveal that there were several rainfall events within three days including the day when the maximum value was recorded. Within three days, in some cases, the rainfall duration excluding the recorded time of annual maximum hourly rainfall (AMHR) is longer than the duration including the recorded time of the AMHR. Figure 4 includes the duration data that show the rainfall is more than 0.5 mm/h and 5 mm/h during the recorded time of the AMHR. The difference between the maximum rainfall duration and the duration of 0.5 mm/h of hourly rainfall is caused by the definition mentioned above. It was found out that the maximum value of the rainfall duration during more than 5 mm/h of hourly rainfall is 14 h. Such long rainfall duration might cause sediment-related disasters. Fig. 4 Historical records of the maximum rainfall duration on the recorded day of the AMHR, duration in more than 0.5 mm/h and 5 mm/h of rainfall at the recorded time of the AMHR.
Hazard curve
This study uses the AMHR data to address the combination hazard. Since structural failure caused by wind-generated missiles is assumed, we selected the maximum instantaneous wind speed at a time when the AMHR was recorded as the wind parameter. This study adopted the duration of more than 5 mm/h of hourly rainfall to evaluate the effects of rainfall. This is conservative assumption because the AMHR has never continued for 14 long hours mentioned above. Now, an annual excess probability distribution can be evaluated by using wind data by Cunnane plotting position formula (Tamori and Kyoshi, 2009 ) and the historical records collected. Based on the wind hazard evaluation methodology (Yamano, et al., 2015a) , an annual excess probability has been evaluated by using wind and rainfall data.
To estimate the hazard curves, we used Gumbel distributions for hourly rainfall, rainfall duration and maximum instantaneous wind speed. The Gumbel cumulative probability distribution function F(X) in terms of hazard intensity X using parameters  and  is expressed as follows.
This equation can be formed as follows.
The parameters of Gumbel distribution are calculated by least square method. Table 1 shows probability distribution parameters for estimating hazard curves. Figure 5 plots a hazard curve of the AMHR by using these parameters based on the rainfall data from 1950 to 2013. This figure includes the annual excess probability of the measured data. Max. duration Duration in more than 0.5mm/h Duration in more than 5mm/h
Rainfall duration (h) Year Yamano, Nishino and Kurisaka, Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol.5, No.4 (2018) shows a hazard curve of the maximum instantaneous wind speed at a time when the AMHR was recorded based on the data from 1967 to 2013. A hazard curve in Fig. 7 presents the duration of more than 5 mm/h of rainfall when the AMHR was recorded based on the data from 1950 to 2013. 
Discretization interval
Yamano, Nishino and Kurisaka, Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol.5, No.4 (2018) [DOI: 10.1299/mej.18-00093] Fig. 7 Hazard curve of the rainfall duration during more than 5 mm/h of hourly rainfall when the AMHR was recorded.
Hazard category
To quantify the event sequence in a PRA, event sequences need to be evaluated for the combination of hazard categories of the three hazard curves in Figs. 5 to 7. The combination hazard analysis considers structural failures caused by the impact of wind-generated missiles, so that the strong wind hazard can be categorized in the same way as the wind PRA (Nishino, et al., 2015) . On the other hand, even a small amount of rainfall could influence the AC heat transfer tubes once the AC roof fails. Therefore, normal rainfall should be also taken into account for the hazard categorization.
As seen in Fig. 5 , this study used eight discretization categories for the hourly rainfall: 20−40 mm/h, 40−60 mm/h, 60−80 mm/h, 80−100 mm/h, 100−120 mm/h, 120−140 mm/h, 140−160 mm/h, and greater than 160 mm/h. In this study, we assumed that no impact is caused by less than 20 mm/h of hourly rainfall on the plant. For conservativeness and simplification, this study assumed a priori heat removal failure if the hourly rainfall is greater than 160 mm/h. With regard to the probability, we used an interval probability of each hazard category, i.e., the difference between two probabilities. In this assessment, the greater values were used for the failure probability (fragility) evaluation in each hazard category for conservativeness. For example, the authors used 40 mm/h for the range of 20−40 mm/h. We used seven discretization categories for the wind speed: 20−40 m/s, 40−60 m/s, 60−80 m/s, 80−100 m/s, 100−120 m/s, 120−140 m/s, and greater than 140 m/s, as shown in Fig. 6 . This study assumed that the wind speed of less than 20 m/s causes no damage on the plant, but the wind speed of greater than 140 m/s leads to heat removal failure. In this paper, the annual excess probability in the wind speed category was replaced to the annual excess frequency using the transformation (AESJ, 2015) .
This study categorized the rainfall duration into nine: 0−10 h, 10−20 h, 20−30 h, 30−40 h, 40−50 h, 50−60 h, 60−70 h, 70−80 h, and greater than 80 h. Likewise, the duration greater than 80 h was assumed to cause heat removal failure.
Using the above categorization, this study generated 504 combinations of hazard categories consisting of 8 hourly rainfalls, 7 wind speeds and 9 rainfall durations.
Event sequence evaluation 3.1 Scenario analysis
The DHRS of the SFR addressed in this study consists of three loops of auxiliary cooling system (ACS) and one loop of maintenance cooling system (MCS). The ACS can be activated by natural and forced circulation modes. The MCS, on the contrary, works only in the forced circulation mode. The forced circulation system requires offsite power or emergency diesel generator (EDG) that requires fuel tanks. If a heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) fails, the electricity distribution system would be failed by heating of the electricity distribution system itself. The electricity distribution is needed for the forced circulation mode. Therefore, the HVAC is also important for the decay heat removal function.
If wind blows very strongly, the decay heat removal failure could be caused by structural failures due to wind load, Annual excess probability
Rainfall duration (h) Discretization interval Yamano, Nishino and Kurisaka, Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol.5, No.4 (2018) [DOI: 10.1299/mej.18-00093] ambient pressure difference, and wind-generated missiles. As mentioned later, the missile impact leading to the structural failure is important in the fragility evaluation. This study treats not only the external wall of the reactor building but also openings, such as doors, intake and outtake of the components equipped with air ventilation. This study also took into account an air stack which is generally very tall for operation of a nuclear power plant. If the air stack collapses due to the wind load, this study assumed the loss of the MCS function because AC of MCS might be structurally damaged by the collapsed stack. In this case, we assumed that the ACS is still available considering the location of three ACS-ACs, which are sufficiently physically separated from the stack.
The DHRS has redundancy thanks to the three loops of ACSs and one loop of MCS. Therefore, the simultaneous failure of these loops is extremely unlikely to occur. In the strong wind PRA (Yamano et al., 2015a) , we assumed a common cause failure of the DHRS (i.e., loss of the one MCS and three ACSs) in an event tree by taking account of fire outbreak due to the failure of the fuel tank hit by wind-generated missiles. In the combination hazard addressed in this paper, on the other hand, the fire could be extinguished by rain. Therefore, this study neglects such a fuel tank fire.
In the extreme rainfall PRA, the heat removal function would be lost by component failure due to flooding or spraying water (Nishino et al., 2016) . These components are a drainage system, sea water pump, electricity device room, EDG, MCS and ACS. Thanks to the drainage system and component layout, such component failure can be practically avoided, so that the present PRA ignores the effect of only rainfall.
In the combination of wind and rainfall, a scenario leading to heat removal failure is considered to be the function loss of ACS, of which heat transfer tubes could crack due to cycle fatigue by cyclic contacts with rain droplets after windgenerated missiles causes ACS roof failure.
In developing the event tree, this study defined three success criteria for decay heat removal except for the abovementioned common cause failure. Criterion 1 is at least one loop of ACSs is available in forced circulation mode. Criterion 2 is in natural circulation mode. Criterion 3 is the forced-circulation MCS is available. If one of the three success criteria is satisfied, the decay heat removal failure can be prevented. Figure 8 shows a main event tree developed in this paper. The vulnerability against the external hazards was focused in this PRA, and thus we neglected component random failures involved usually in an internal-event PRA. As mentioned above, the influence of strong wind is emphasized on the event tree. The headings of frontline systems of the DHRS are Yamano, Nishino and Kurisaka, Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol.5, No.4 (2018) [DOI: 10.1299/mej.18-00093] MCS and ACSs. In the natural circulation mode, manual operation by personnel can be expected to control the opening of the ACS-AC dampers. The forced circulation mode requires the support system which is composed of the EDG and HVAC. In the strong wind assessment, extensive components should be taken into account. The air stack and the fuel tank were identified as the extensive components which would influence the frontline and support systems if they fail.
Event tree
It is well known that very strong winds could cause the loss of offsite power (LOSP). Once the power line is damaged, its recovery in a short time would be difficult. Therefore, this study assumed a priori that the offsite power is lost in the strong wind PRA. Considering the importance of ACS, we assumed the structural failure of ACS intake/outtake as well as the failure of ACS-AC manual operation. This event tree analysis indicated 22 event sequences which result in heat removal failure (i.e., core damage). The subsequent numbers involve the sequences with the air stack failure.
To quantify the main event tree, a sub-event tree was also developed for each branch. In particular, the effect of the combination hazard of wind and rain was incorporated into the sub-event tree of the ACS outtake presented in Fig. 9 . Fig. 9 Sub-event tree for the ACS outtake.
Failure probability evaluation 4.1 Failure due to wind 4.1.1 Failure caused by wind load
We assumed an air stack fragility curve through a rough estimation by expressing the cumulative normal distribution using the wind speeds of 117 m/s and 168 m/s corresponding to 3 probability in the tornado PRA . The reactor building failure probability was also estimated in the tornado PRA . Its estimate was negligibly small in the maximum speed (140 m/s) addressed in the wind PRA, resulting in the assumption of no damage of the reactor building by the wind load. The above estimation allows us to preclude the failures of the reactor building from the event tree.
Failure caused by pressure difference
The pressure load generated by the pressure difference has also been calculated in the previous study . No failure of components relating to the DHRS can be regarded within the wind-speed range treated in this PRA. This consideration led to no need to include it into the event tree.
Failure caused by missiles
Missiles generated by a tornado can fly long distance due to updraft, whereas no wind-generated missiles could be raised by updraft. From this reason, we considered only horizontal speeds. Referring to the tornado evaluation guide (NRA, 2013), we categorized missile candidates into 1) objects with large momentum (e.g., car and container), 2) objects that can penetrate the reactor building wall (e.g., steel pipe and steel beam, 3) small objects that can enter the reactor building through the intake/outtake of the openings (e.g., gravel), and 4) flying objects coming from a high elevation (e.g., woods in a forest nearby). Size and weight of these can be found in the reference (NRC, 1987) . The failure probability evaluation which is described later showed no potential failure of structure by the gravel; hence the gravel is not mentioned afterwards.
If the missiles enter a duct of the DHRS-AC through the intake, the AC heat transfer tubes might fail, resulting in the core damage. The HVAC might also fail unless air is taken from the inlet of the ventilating opening of the HVAC. Yamano, Nishino and Kurisaka, Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol.5, No.4 (2018) [DOI: 10.1299/mej.18-00093]
Locations of these inlets were assumed at a high elevation of several ten meters. On the contrary, the EDG was assumed to be placed at a low elevation of several meters. The fuel tanks are located outside the building at a low elevation.
It is necessary to calculate the probability that the missiles enter the duct through the DHRS intake/outtake and the air ventilator inlet as well as the probability that the missiles hit the fuel tank. These probabilities have been defined as a multiplication of three parameters which consist of an impact parameter, the number of missiles, and target areas (KEPCO, 2013) . In this study, the impact parameter was assumed conservatively 7.9 × 10 -8 /m 2 for a small target with high exposure (e.g., external walls, outside structures) (NRC, 1987) . We assumed the number of the missiles as 20,000 for steel pipes and beams, and 50 for cars and containers. The target areas are areas for intake, outtake or air ventilator inlet of target components. The area for the fuel tank was regarded as a two-dimensionally projected area of sphere of eight-meter in diameter. Based on the above assumptions, the impact probabilities of components were estimated. The impact probability of flying trees from the adjacent forest was also estimated by using a developed probability model (Nishino et al., 2015) .
The failure probabilities of components were defined as the missile impact probability multiplied by fragility of structures. The calculation of the fragility needs the estimate of the missile speed which can be estimated by using relation between aerodynamic parameters and missile speed at wind speed of 100 m/s (Eguchi et al., 2014) .
If the missiles hit the components, thick walls could prevent from the penetration of missiles. The minimum thickness that can keep the structural integrity of steel plate can be estimated by a conventional formulation, called BRL equation (KEPCO, 2013) .
In this paper, the fragility was assumed to take a median value at the missile speed corresponding to the minimum thickness for the structural integrity. Assuming a log-normal distribution having the logarithmic standard deviation of 0.2, we estimated at 95% confidence curves for plate thicknesses against the wind hazard category corresponding to the missile speed.
Unlike a tornado, strong wind cannot uplift the missiles. Thus the missiles on the ground (i.e., steel pipes, steel beams, containers and cars) would not hit the components. However, only trees are expected to hit the components from the forest at a high elevation.
The EDG is placed in the EDG room surrounded by several walls. The AC inlet of ACS and MCS is also placed in the several-walled building. For these components, the fragilities were estimated by multiplying individual fragility corresponding to the thickness.
Based on the missile impact probability and the fragility of structures obtained above, we calculated the failure probabilities of components as their products for the quantification of the event sequence.
Failure due to rain
As mentioned before, rainfall is assumed to cause no failure because the loss of heat removal function is unlikely to occur only due to rainfall.
Failure due to combination of wind and rain 4.3.1 Failure of ACS-AC roof caused by missiles
The fragility of the ACS-AC roof can be calculated using the BRL equation as stated in Section 4.1.
Falling of rain droplet inside the ACS-AC duct
If the ACS-AC roof fails, rain droplets fall and contact with the heat transfer tubes inside the ACS-AC duct. Although the ACS damper is expected to prevent rain droplets from entering depending on its opening degree, this study assumed that the rain droplets can contact with the tubes without any obstacles. The temperature of a rain droplet can increase as a result of the heat transfer between the droplets and hot counter-flow air heated by the heat transfer tubes. We assumed that the droplet cannot contact with the tube because it evaporates when its temperature reaches the vaporization temperature, i.e., 100°C.
The forced convection heat transfer between the droplet and the ACS-AC air is expressed using Ranz-Mashall equation (JSME, 1986), Yamano, Nishino and Kurisaka, Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol.5, No.4 (2018) It is said that the diameter and velocity of a falling rain droplet are approximately 5 mm and 10 m/s, respectively (Ogura, 1984) . Although there are various kinds of rains such as fog and hailstorm, the diameters range approximately from 1 to 5 mm (Ogura, 1984) . Based on this information, this study assumed a log-normal distribution with 2 mm of mean diameter and 2.5 mm of standard deviation as shown in Fig. 10 .
The temperature of the droplet can be calculated by assuming the initial temperature of a single droplet based on the heat balance by the following equation, T is the air temperature at n step (°C), and   is the time step.
The falling velocity of the rain droplet into the AC duct can be calculated by the following equation,
where AC F is the air flow rate, and AC A is the cross-sectional area of AC duct. The falling velocity of rain droplet outside the duct ,0 drop v was assumed constant (10 m/s) regardless of its diameter for simplification.
Given that the air flow rate depends on the temperature at the ACS-AC exit, the droplet falling velocity drop v becomes 4.4 m/s at 400°C (5.1 m/s at 500°C) of air temperature in this paper. In this estimation, the change in droplet diameter due to its surface evaporation was neglected for simplification. Figure 11 shows the temperature of the droplet of every 0.5 mm from 2 to 4 mm in diameter inside the AC duct at the air temperature (400°C) based on Eqs. (5) and (6). The distance from the roof to the heat transfer tube was assumed to be 8.8 m. This figure indicates that a 2 mm-diameter droplet cannot reach the tube by being evaporated, whereas a 2.5-mm droplet can reach the tube. When the air temperature is 500°C or 600°C, the droplet of larger than 3 mm or 3.5 mm can reach the tube, respectively. Yamano, Nishino and Kurisaka, Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol.5, No.4 (2018) [DOI: 10.1299/mej.18-00093] This estimation is conservative because in reality the diameter would become smaller due to its surface evaporation. This study assumed a constant air temperature of 20°C at the ACS-AC intake. The effect of the intake air temperature is considered small because its temperature is significantly heated by the sodium temperature inside the tube even though the ambient air temperature is affected by weather conditions.
Thermal shock of ACS-AC heat transfer tube caused by a contact with rain droplet
A thermal shock is given to the heat transfer tube by a local temperature decrease when rain droplets contact with the tube. For instance, the temperature of a 5-mm droplet can be estimated to increase up to 20°C through the AC duct at 600°C. This sensible heat is 5.5 J which is remarkably smaller than 147 J of the latent heat estimated with 2.3 MJ/kg. Here, we ignored the sensible heat for simplification, and thus only the latent heat was taken into account in this study.
The local temperature decrease of the heat transfer tube is the vaporization temperature of droplet (°C). Since the tube temperature cannot fall below 100 °C corresponding to the vaporization temperature of rain droplet, the temperature decrease of the tube must be restricted by the difference between the initial tube temperature and the water vaporization temperature. Figure 12 shows the local temperature of the heat transfer tube considering the tube temperature decrease due to rain droplet contact at the initial tube temperature (400°C) by using Eq. (7). In reality, the heat transfer area of a droplet on the tube surface would spread when the droplet contacts with the tube. Therefore, the droplet spreading factor is taken into account in this study. When this factor increases, the local temperature decrease becomes smaller in the present simple calculation because the heat capacity of the tube is large due to the large heat transfer area contributing to the temperature decrease.
The thermal stress caused by the rain-droplet contact with the tube is expressed by the following equation, The thermal stress can be calculated by substituting Eq. (7) for Eq. (8). Figure 13 shows the thermal stress at the initial tube temperature of 400°C with a parameter of the droplet spreading factor. Yamano, Nishino and Kurisaka, Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol.5, No.4 (2018) [DOI: 10.1299/mej.18-00093] Fig. 12 Local temperature of the heat transfer tube. Fig. 13 Thermal stress of the heat transfer tube.
Cycle fatigue of ACS-AC heat transfer tube caused by cyclic contact with rain droplet
The authors supposed that the failure of ductile materials such as austenitic stainless steel is caused, not by the thermal shock due to one-time contact, but by cycle fatigue due to cyclic contacts of rain droplets. Here, the heat transfer tube is postulated to fail when the number of cycles of rain droplets that contact with the tube exceeds the allowable number of the cycles which is deduced from a design fatigue curve. To obtain the allowable number, it is necessary to calculate the number of rain droplet contacts with the tube against hourly rainfall conditions. The number of rain droplets per area can be calculated by dividing the hourly rainfall (mm/h) P by the single droplet volume 
which is plotted in Fig. 15 .
The design fatigue curve of austenitic stainless steel is shown in Fig. 16 , referring to the JSME code (JSME, 2011). The allowable number of the cycles limit N can be obtained from the fatigue curve and the thermal stress  produced by a droplet contact if we specify the initial heat transfer tube temperature, droplet size, and droplet spreading factor. The grace period to the fatigue failure of the heat transfer tube can be calculated by dividing the allowable number of the cycles limit N by the number of droplet contact per hour drop N , as shown in Fig. 17 . In this study, we assume that the heat transfer tube of the ACS-AC outtake fails when the rainfall duration exceeds the grace period to the fatigue failure. Yamano, Nishino and Kurisaka, Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol.5, No.4 (2018) [DOI: 10.1299/mej.18-00093] Fig. 14 The number of rain droplets per area. Fig. 15 The number of rain droplet contacts with tube per hour. Nishino and Kurisaka, Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol.5, No.4 (2018) [DOI: 10.1299/mej.18-00093]
Manual operation failure probability of ACS-AC dampers
In the manual operation of the AC dampers, sodium temperature measurement is necessary to prevent sodium freezing due to excessive cooling caused by keeping the damper opened. The reactor coolant temperature usually decreases to about 250°C in three days and then reaches about 200°C in several days under the natural circulation heat removal condition with three-loop ACSs. In the present PRA, the rainfall duration was considered as 80 h (approximately three days) at the longest. Within three days, sodium freezing in the ACS can be neglected judging from the sodium temperature decrease history mentioned above. In the present PRA, therefore, the sodium temperature measurement is not necessary.
The failure of the natural circulation cooling was assumed to be dependent on the manual operation failure of the AC damper opening. Based on NUREG/CR-1278 (NRC, 1983) , the human error probability was specified in regard to the opening operation of a single damper in the one-loop AC. The manual operation failure probability was estimated to be 1.2×10 -4 /demand assuming a high dependence of recovery task by two plant personnel and a low dependence of recovery by plant parameter diagnostics after the task. This estimate was multiplied by 5 assuming very high stress level and stepby-step tasks of skilled personnel. Finally, the failure probability of the AC damper manual operation was estimated at 3.3×10 -3 /demand as an average value using an error factor of 10. Given that the available time is very long in this operation probability estimation, this study takes into account the performance shaping factor based on the available time. According to SPAR-H method (Gertman et al., 2005) , the available-time performance shaping factor is 0.01 considering that the available time is 50 times longer than the time required. Based on the above assumptions, the manual operation failure probability is estimated to be about 3.3×10 -5
.
Quantification of event sequence
The decay heat removal failure probability of each event sequence was obtained by introducing the failure probability of components in Section 4 into the event tree in Section 3.2. The CDF by the hazard category can be calculated by multiplying each heat removal failure probability described above and occurrence frequency of each hazard category.
When the assumptions are 400°C of air temperature inside the AC and 1.0 of droplet spreading factor for the combination effect of wind and rain, the CDF became about 2×10 -6 /year. The CDFs and the conditional heat removal failure probability by the event sequences are shown in Figs. 18 and 19 , respectively. The most dominant sequence (~62%) is Seq-9, which stands for the fuel tank failure and the ACS-AC manual operation failure. The second dominant sequence (~38%) is Seq-10, which is represented by the fuel tank failure and the ACS-AC outtake failure. The third dominant sequence (~0.1%) is Seq-11, which is the fuel tank failure and the subsequent ACS-AC intake failure.
The CDF involving the fatigue failure of the heat transfer tubes is about 3×10
-9
/year (~0.2%). This sequence can appear when the ACS roof is failed by strong wind. In such a case, the AC heat transfer tubes are also assumed to fail; so that the sequence resulting from the fatigue failure of the tube could not be actualized in this assessment. We found that this is responsible for low CDF in case of involving the fatigue failure of the heat transfer tube, namely the effect of wind-rain combination. This effect is investigated by a sensitivity analysis in the next section.
The CDFs by the hazard category are presented in Looking at the sequence in detail, we can find that the most dominant sequence (~44%) is Seq-9 under the hazard category (0.14/year) consisting of 20−40 m/s of wind speed, 20−40 mm/h of hourly rainfall, and 0−10 h of rainfall duration. The second dominant sequence (~24%) is Seq-10 under the hazard category (0.04/year) consisting of 20−40 m/s of wind speed, 40−60 mm/h of hourly rainfall, and 0−10 h of rainfall duration. The third dominant sequence (~12%) is Seq-9 under the hazard category (0.004/year) consisting of 40−60 m/s of wind speed, 20−40 mm/h of hourly rainfall, and 0−10 h of rainfall duration. These are high frequent hazard combinations; therefore we should pay attention to likely hazards rather than unlikely severe hazards. Yamano, Nishino and Kurisaka, Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol.5, No.4 (2018) [DOI: 10.1299/mej.18-00093] In general, it is said that there is very large uncertainty in the external hazard evaluation. Although this study uses the Gumbel distribution, the probability would be reduced by using the Weibull distribution. As shown in Figs. 20−22, however, the dominant hazard categories correspond to low intensity which is nearly close to the maximum value of measured data. For such a hazard intensity level, its hazard probability could be significantly unchanged even if the distribution type is different. Therefore, the uncertainty of the hazard curve could not significantly influence the CDF estimation. The fragility evaluation, on the contrary, could strongly depend on the thickness of structures, etc. Therefore, the uncertainty of the fragility should be investigated by sensitivity analyses, and should be reduced through experimental and analytical efforts in the future.
As mentioned above, the most dominant rainfall duration is 0−10 h. In the plant addressed in this paper, the core damage caused by the failure of heated boundary could be eliminated because of the large heat capacity of the reactor coolant even if the AC damper manual operation failure continued for a long time (up to approx. 20 h). In case that durations of wind and rainfall are short (e.g., 10 h), the manual operation failure could be eliminated. Based on this consideration, we can expect that the CDF will be lower than the above-estimated value if the failure probability of the AC damper manual operation is significantly low in less severe hazard categories.
The total CDFs remain unchanged even if the droplet spreading factor and the air temperature inside the AC changed. This is because the CDF in the sequence involving the wind-rain combination (effects of the fatigue failure) is lower than the total by two orders of magnitude.
From the above quantification, the high-risk contributors are high frequent hazard combination; therefore this result implies that it is worthwhile to consider the adequate measures against wind-generated missiles and reliability improvement of the damper operation for less severe external hazard conditions. Conditional heat removal failure probability Sequence number Yamano, Nishino and Kurisaka, Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol.5, No.4 (2018) [DOI: 10.1299/mej.18-00093] 
Sensitivity analysis
The present study assumes the failure of the AC heat transfer tubes in conjunction with the ACS-AC outtake roof failure caused by wind-generated missiles. However, we can also expect that the heat transfer tubes do not always fail even after the AC roof failure. Here, we assumed 0.1 of conditional failure probability of the tube after the AC roof failure. The total CDF becomes about 1×10 -7 /year, which corresponds to ~71% of the reference CDF described in the previous section. Figure 23 shows the CDFs resulting from the event sequences. The most dominant sequence (~88%) is Seq-9, and Rainfall duration (h) Yamano, Nishino and Kurisaka, Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol.5, No.4 (2018) [DOI: 10.1299/mej.18-00093] the second dominant sequence (~12%) is Seq-10. This is the same tendency as the reference quantification in the previous section. With regard to the CDFs by the hazard category, the dominant categories are also the same as the reference quantification. The three dominant category fractions are ~63%, ~17% and ~8%, respectively.
The total CDF involving the wind-rain combination sequences is about 8×10
-8 /year (~7%). The introduction of the conditional failure probability contributed to the appearance of the wind-rain combination effect, although this contribution is quite limited. This result indicates that it is necessary to improve impact probability estimation and fragility evaluation. 
Conclusions
In this study, we have developed the PRA methodology against the combination hazard of strong wind and rainfall. Three kinds of hazard curves have been developed for instantaneous wind speed, hourly rainfall, and rainfall duration, with which the combined hazard category was defined. In the combination hazard of strong wind and rainfall, the event tree was developed focusing mainly on the effect of the wind-generated missiles because little impact of rain is expected. For the specific scenario describing the wind-rain combination, the event sequence was characterized by the function loss of ACS, of which the heat transfer tubes could crack due to the cycle fatigue by cyclic contact of rain droplets. This situation could occur if rain droplets enter into the AC after the AC roof failure due to the wind-generated-missile impact. Finally, the CDF has been estimated about 2×10 -6 /year in total by multiplying the discrete hazard frequencies by the conditional decay heat removal failure probabilities. The dominant sequence is the failure of the ACS by the missile impact following the failure of external fuel tank caused by the missile impact. The dominant hazard is the maximum instantaneous wind speed of 20−40 m/s, the hourly rainfall of 20−40 mm/h, and the rainfall duration of 0−10 h. This study successfully developed the wind-rain combination PRA methodology. 
